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To devote a collection of essays to the work of a practising philosopher is not of 
itself remarkable. To adopt as the title of such a volume an unequivocal exhortation is, 
if not unprecedented, striking to say the least. It signals immediately the interventionist 
character of Badiou’s thought, its potential to puncture and transform the structures that 
underpin contemporary philosophy and, by extension, the plethora of critical perspec-
tives that have evolved under the rubric of poststructuralist theory. At the same time 
it masks an ambivalence of address: just who is being asked to ‘think again’? The most 
immediate answer is the myriad of doubters and sceptics whose voices can be heard at 
any seminar or conference paper devoted to Badiou’s work. Inevitably there are objec-
tions from Kantians, Hegelians and Deleuzeans (to name just a few) who are  disturbed, 
if not visibly incensed, by what they see as Badiou’s ‘misrepresentation’ of their field of 
specialization. And most threatened, it would seem, are Heideggerians who refuse to 
countenance Badiou’s radical separation of ontology, the science of being qua being, 
from any form of phenomenological consciousness. Other objections come from liter-
ary and cultural theorists: how, they ask, can Badiou claim that art is not political when 
the political content of so much art is self-evident? But it is not only the doubters who 
are targeted by Hallward’s exhortation. Some of the most perceptive essays succeed in 
unveiling points at which Badiou’s thought itself exposes its limits; in such instances it is 
Badiou who is urged to rethink particular aspects of his project. And to take yet another 
tack, one could read Hallward’s title as a paean to what emerges once more as the very 
possibility of the philosophical enterprise, to Badiou’s emphatic demonstration that phi-
losophy’s post-Nietzschean ‘death’ was no more than an extended hibernation.
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Think Again is not exactly an introduction to Badiou’s work and most of the essays 
would make little sense to anyone unfamiliar with the fundamentals of his ontology. It 
is, as Hallward points out, a ‘collection of critical responses’ (1) and needs to be read 
alongside more explicitly introductory material and, above all, in conjunction with Ba-
diou’s own writing, an ever-expanding range of which is becoming available in English 
translations. given the often sophisticated level at which many of the contributors en-
gage with Badiou’s thought, one might well wonder at the purpose of the ‘overview’ 
that occupies the major part of  Hallward’s introductory chapter. Ostensibly directed at 
readers who are ‘new’ to Badiou’s philosophy, it reaches rather too gesturally towards 
the axiomatic foundations of Badiou’s thought to establish its validity and, at the same 
time, it is insufficiently nuanced to contextualize with any precision the critical interven-
tions of particular contributors. Its main value is to remind the reader who has read at 
least some of Badiou’s work of the interrelation of its various elements.  
The remaining part of the introduction which seeks to summarize the main areas of 
contention in Badiou’s thought is equally problematic. Here the difficulty relates to the 
somewhat anomalous position Hallward adopts towards the aspects of Badiou’s work 
he identifies as questionable. Particularly puzzling is the way that, following a discus-
sion of largely spurious objections, he qualifies his remarks by suggesting that over time 
‘much of their importance has steadily eroded away’ (20). Would it not be more useful, 
one wonders, to present this revised assessment directly? It seems that Hallward is more 
concerned to anticipate the negative responses of his readers than to offer a dispassion-
ate appraisal of Badiou’s philosophy. One suspects, too, that this approach represents 
a gesture of accommodation towards those contributors who, for various reasons that 
ultimately do not stand up, are antagonistic towards certain of Badiou’s claims.
Excessive carping about the book’s shortcomings, however, would render a distinct 
disservice to what overall is undoubtedly an important and, as Hallward suggests, timely 
publication. The seventeen essays are grouped judiciously so as to focus progressively 
on key areas of Badiou’s thought: his ontology, the related concepts of the event and 
fidelity to the event, and the four regimes of truth with particular emphasis on politics 
and art. While Being and Event receives the most expansive treatment there are essays 
that give explicit attention to other important texts such as Deleuze: The Clamor of  Be-
ing, Théorie du sujet, The Century and Handbook of  Inaesthetics. If, as I have indicated, the 
at times trenchantly argued attempts to challenge the validity of particular claims are 
largely unsuccessful, they nevertheless contribute usefully to the collection, first by iden-
tifying obstacles to the reception of Badiou’s thought and second by testing what might 
be described as the committed reader’s fidelity to the Badiou ‘event’, forcing him or her 
to mount a counter-argument in defence of Badiou’s position. At the other extreme are 
contributions by those who are quite unambiguously converts to Badiou’s philosophy. 
Importantly, too, the essays in this category are, without exception, much more than 
straightforward explications of Badiou’s thought. In some instances they trace its gene-
alogy, and by contextualizing and grounding it within particular intellectual traditions 
they bring into focus its function as what Badiou might call a situated inquiry, effectively 
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defusing perceptions that it is in some way aberrantly idiosyncratic. Other essays, in 
contradistinction to the spurious objections characteristic of the first category, identify 
aspects of Badiou’s work that are genuinely problematic and suggest approaches that 
might overcome particular aporias. And by no means of least significance, yet another 
type of response undertakes a detailed analysis of fundamental Badouian concepts. The 
value of such discussions, a notable example of which is Alberto Toscano’s clarification 
of the notion of fidelity in ‘Communism as Separation’, is that they expose the errone-
ous assumptions underpinning arguments that are typically used to discredit Badiou’s 
views.
Hostility towards Badiou’s philosophy falls broadly into two categories. Some critics 
take umbrage at claims which, if endorsed, would render their own cherished positions 
untenable: protection of intellectual turf in such instances becomes paramount. Todd 
May strives with considerable ingenuity to rescue Deleuze from Badiou’s insistence that, 
in spite of his emphasis on plurality, he remains essentially a philosopher of the one. So 
deftly does Badiou dislodge the foundations of the Deleuzean edifice that no amount 
of sophistry can repair the damage.  Other critics object to the minimalism of Badiou’s 
ontology, to its radical exclusion of the phenomenological concerns that they refuse to 
relinquish from philosophy’s grip. Here, it is Jean-Toussaint Desanti who comes most 
immediately to mind with his discussion of what he calls Badiou’s ‘intrinsic’ ontology. 
Badiou’s ‘choice’ of a minimal ontology, he argues, does not in any way eliminate the 
need for ontology to account for being in a more expansive sense. This emphasis on 
‘choice’ as if it were simply a matter of personal predilection entirely overlooks Badiou’s 
rigorously axiomatic development and exposition of his thesis. It is only his foundational 
decisions that (i) mathematics is ontology and (ii) the ‘one’ does not exist that could be 
construed as acts of choice. Even these decisions, though, are, as Badiou has pointed 
out, not arbitrary but based empirically on the logical impasse generated by alternative 
points of departure.1  
Another line of demarcation could be drawn between those who criticize, often 
from a position of fidelity to the Badiouian event, aspects of Badiou’s procedural meth-
odology, and those who, like Desanti, attack Badiou for failing to encompass what at 
no stage he sets out to encompass. Implicit in most such critiques is the assumption that 
ontology must, by definition, account for every conceivable aspect of being, that it must 
contain within it the promise of boundless plenitude. But it is precisely this kind of total-
izing gesture that Badiou is at pains to avoid. In a brief response to his critics, he stresses 
the limits of his enquiry into the nature of being:
It is very important to grant a statement from the very beginning of Being and 
Event its full scope: ontology is a situation. Or, if you prefer: ontology is a world. 
This means that the mathematical theory of pure multiplicity in no way claims to 
inform the way we might think everything that is presented in the infinity of real 
1. See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, London, Continuum, 2005, pp. 4-9; 23-25 
(henceforth BE). The impasse of the one as a foundational entity is also discussed in Meditation 10, ‘Spino-
za’, pp. 112-120. 
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situations, but only the thinking of  presentation as such. This is what I call, adopting 
the vocabulary of the philosophical tradition, being qua being (233).
Clearly, there is nothing in Badiou’s ontology that challenges the validity of Desanti’s 
concerns per se. When, for example, Desanti asks (60) how we are to gain access to what 
he calls ‘modes of presence’ (seemingly just another version of his need to know who 
performs the count-as-one and in what ‘realm’), he raises questions that, however perti-
nent they might be to the world of ‘real situations’, have nothing to do with the ‘thinking 
of presentation as such’. If Badiou’s ontology were to embrace these concerns by extend-
ing itself into its ‘margins’ (to use another of Desanti’s terms), it would immediately lose 
the rigour that sets it so decisively and productively against the grain of poststructuralist 
indeterminacy.
Ernesto Laclau’s critique of Badiou’s ontology or, more precisely, of the extra-onto-
logical status of the Badiouian event is at a formal level the inverse of Desanti’s. Where 
Desanti has nothing but praise for Badiou’s procedural thoroughness—the reader, he in-
sists, will find ‘admirably set out, all the mathematical instructions required in order to 
follow [the book’s] argument’ (63)—Laclau enthusiastically embraces Badiou’s inter-
ventionist notion of ethical engagement but rejects entirely the theoretical apparatus 
that underpins his concept of fidelity. What for Laclau is particularly problematic is the 
relation between the evental site, the subject and the constitution of a truth procedure. 
Once again, though, it is a critique that founders on its distortion of Badiou’s fundamen-
tal categories. Rather than pursue in a rigorous way Badiou’s suturing of ethical com-
mitment to the constitution of the subject, he persists with a focus on the curious notion 
of ‘filling’ the void, arguing that, even though this process is incompatible with Badiou’s 
ontology, it nevertheless requires ‘theoretical description’ (125). At the heart of Laclau’s 
protestations is a refusal of the mathematical basis of ontology, but it is a refusal that is jus-
tified by only the most cursory reference to Badiou’s use of set theory. Before canvassing 
the possibility of situations in which the ‘logic of representation might lose its structuring 
abilities’ (125), Laclau might have made a more systematic examination Badiou’s exposi-
tion of such crucial concepts as the event, the evental site, the state’s ‘prohibition’ of the 
event and the act of subjective intervention.2 It soon becomes clear, though, that what 
is at stake for Laclau is the inability of set theory to account for what is not included in 
a situation in terms other than the void. Of course, what in a given situation escapes 
the count is not nothing in any absolute sense and, contrary to the impression given by 
Laclau, set theory at no point makes any such claim; it simply has no existence for the 
situation. It is precisely because Laclau’s own project—the articulation of his theory of 
‘hegemonic universality’ (131-2)—is rooted in what he mistakenly takes to be voided un-
conditionally by set theory that he finds it necessary to dismiss Badiou’s ontology. A more 
productive exchange might emerge if Laclau were to regard his formulations as part of 
a different, that is, non-ontological, situation.  
2. See BE, Meditations 16 (‘Evental Sites and Historical Situations’, pp. 173-177), 17 (‘The Matheme of the 
Event’, pp. 178-183), 18 (‘Being’s Prohibition of the Event’, pp. 184-190), 20 (‘The Intervention’, pp. 201-211). 
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Jean-Luc Nancy is another contributor who, like Laclau, frames his critique through 
his own hardly inconsiderable philosophical enterprise and accordingly misrepresents 
important elements of Badiou’s project. In spite of being ‘close’ on certain points, Nancy 
insists that he and Badiou ‘inhabit utterly different sites of thought’ (39), an observation 
which appears to license him to ‘force’ Badiou into an entirely alien theoretical context. 
A prime example is where Nancy takes Badiou to task for his account of the origins of 
philosophy, ex nihilo, as a consequence of Plato’s foundational gesture. In disputing this 
account Nancy blurs what for Badiou is a crucial distinction between generic form, or 
discursive mode, and articulated content. At issue is not the emergence, several centuries 
before Plato, of ‘philosophy’ as a discursive focus on what Nancy calls the ‘deconstruc-
tion of the structures of a crumbling … mythico-religious world’ (45), but the wresting 
of that discourse from the clutches of the poem so as to constitute an independent, 
‘properly’ philosophical mode of enquiry. Like Desanti’s critique, Nancy’s is based on 
the assumption that Badiou’s claims are other than they actually are.
In some instances Badiou emerges only marginally more intact at the hands of those 
who might be regarded as his disciples. Again, it is the desire of individual commenta-
tors to suture Badiou’s thought to their own projects that leads to a positioning of Badiou 
that hovers ambivalently between misrepresentation and valid critique. Bruno Bosteels’ 
attempt to reconfigure Badiou as the practitioner of a new kind of dialectics falls clear-
ly into this category. Even though he acknowledges the separateness of the realms of 
‘being’ and ‘event’, he nevertheless insists that this non-relationality does not foreclose 
the possibility of a ‘dialectical dimension’ (153). But by definition dialectics involves the 
resolution of an impasse through reference to its constituent polarities which, as Bos-
teels once again acknowledges, is precisely what Badiou’s deployment of mathematics 
circumvents. To substantiate his claim, Bosteels finds it necessary to distinguish between 
the conventional or positivist form of dialectics, between, for example ‘nature’ and ‘his-
tory’, and ‘another’ dialectic that is ‘capable of thinking through the material rupture 
produced by a political intervention’ without recourse to positivist categories (155). Im-
pregnably, it may seem, this move is validated for Bosteels by Badiou’s own reference in 
Being and Event to the ‘dialectic of the void and excess’ (159). Yet, of the two occurrences 
of this phrase, only one, linked to a discussion of the irreducible persistence of the state, 
offers the possibility of the kind of construction Bosteels seeks to impose on it:
It is not antagonism which lies at the origin of the State, because one cannot think 
the dialectic of the void and excess as antagonism. No doubt politics itself must 
originate in the very same place as the state: in that dialectic. But this is certainly 
not to seize the State nor to double the State’s effect. On the contrary, politics 
stakes its existence on its capacity to establish a relation to both the void and excess 
which is essentially different to that of the State; it is this difference alone that 
subtracts politics from the one of statist re-insurance (BE 110).
At first glance the originatory status of the ‘dialectic of the void and excess’ seems 
to be affirmed. Just what this exchange might mean, though, if it is not founded on 
‘antagonism’, is not entirely clear. At face value the statement is oxymoronic: without 
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antagonism, how can there be a dialectic? The term, however, may simply signify the 
residual site of a dialectic, in the conventional sense, without necessarily implying the 
need for a ‘new’ form of dialectic. In any event it seems rather too slender a basis for 
Bosteels’ claims.3 
While not exactly a disciple, Slavoj Žižek is nevertheless strongly supportive of much 
of Badiou’s work. But even he, I would argue, manages to misrepresent Badiou’s position 
in his otherwise very useful systematization of Badiou’s relation to Lacan (‘From Purifi-
cation to Subtraction: Badiou and the Real’). While Badiou’s debt to Lacan is extensive, 
there is, Žižek insists, an important difference between their respective accounts of the 
concept of truth and its status vis-à-vis the Real. For Lacan the Real represents the ab-
solute limit of human experience; it can, under certain circumstances, be encountered, 
but not traversed and any attempt on the basis of that encounter to ‘impose a new order’ 
is necessarily an illusion (171). As a moment of truth the encounter amounts to no more 
than a ‘shattering experience of the Void—a sudden insight into the abyss of Being’, 
while for Badiou ‘Truth’ is the ‘long, arduous work of fidelity that follows an encounter 
with the real’ (171-2). It is in further delineating this difference that Žižek paints rather 
too stark a contrast between the two positions. As he puts it, the ‘work of fidelity’ that 
for Badiou brings about a new order ‘“sublates” the exploding negativity into a new 
consistent truth, while for Lacan, every Truth displays the structure of a (symbolic) fic-
tion’ (177). What this distinction overlooks, however, is Badiou’s insistence that the ideal 
that inspires the truth procedure is never fully realized, and that there is always a gap 
between it and what a new order actually achieves. In other words, that which is articu-
lated or enacted in the name of a truth must necessarily be distinguished from the same 
truth at the moment of  its subjective apprehension.    
By far the most incisive contributions are those that engage with Badiou’s work on 
its own terms and, as I’ve suggested, they fall into three broad categories: (i) attempts 
to situate Badiou’s thought within specific intellectual traditions, (ii) the identification of 
particular aporias, and (iii) explications of pivotal, and often misunderstood, concepts. It 
remains to survey each of these in turn.
A very fine example of the first category is Etienne Balibar’s essay ‘The History of 
Truth: Alain Badiou in French Philosophy’. The first part of Balibar’s title is taken from 
Pascal’s Pensées, or more precisely, from the quotation with which Badiou introduces 
his meditation on Pascal, and serves to emphasize what he sees as its centrality to the 
evolution of Badiou’s notion of fidelity. Pascal’s significance is twofold: not only, Balibar 
notes, was he the first to conceive of truth as having a history, but, even more crucially, 
he exemplifies for Badiou the thinking of truth as militant engagement. Importantly, too, 
3. The second use of the expression ‘dialectic of the void and excess’ renders it even more marginal to 
Badiou’s thought. Here, referring to Spinoza’s achievement, Badiou identifies this dialectic as foreclosed by 
presentation or, in terms of the situation, non-existent: ‘Th[e] essential homogeneity of presentation expels the 
un-measure in which the dialectic of  the void and excess might be revealed, or encountered, within presentation’ (BE, 
p. 117, my emphasis). It seems likely that the unthinkability of this dialectic is precisely the reason that it plays 
no further part in Badiou’s exposition. 
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the discourse of the history of truth has its own subsequent history and it is within—or, 
more pertinently, in opposition to—the trajectory of this discourse that Balibar situates 
Badiou’s use of Pascal. In contrast to Derrida’s insistence on the illusory status of any 
‘temporalization of idealities’ (24) and to Foucault’s reinscription of the notion of truth 
within variable systems of power relations, Badiou radically reconceptualizes truth in 
a way that ‘relates neither to the idea of a transcendental appearance, nor to the idea 
of an intellectual dialectic, nor to the idea of self-knowledge’ (28-9). The radical nature 
of Badiou’s intervention is, of course, underscored by its grounding in set theory, and 
Balibar makes the observation that, in France at any rate, Badiou is ‘no doubt the first 
person since [Jean] Cavaillès to have taken seriously …the need to discuss the question 
of truth in terms of an essential relationship with mathematics’ (30). Further, Badiou 
shares with Cavaillès a concern to articulate that relationship in such a way that it is 
‘extricated from all subordination to the logical concept of a rule and from syntactico-
semantic correspondence’ (30). This insistence brings him into headlong conflict with 
the influential Polish mathematician Alfred Tarski whose 1935 paper ‘The Concept of 
Truth in Formalized Languages’ underpins important developments in modern logical 
theory. By delineating carefully the focus of Cavaillès’ investigations and by attending 
closely to details of Tarski’s schema alongside key elements of what he calls Badiou’s 
‘meta-mathematics’, Balibar manages not only to position Badiou’s work with impressive 
precision but also to demonstrate its potentially wide-ranging significance. Over and 
above the reinvigoration of the continental tradition, it has the power, Balibar suggests 
provocatively, to ‘destroy the defences of so-called analytic philosophy, to the extent that 
it can still recognize itself in Tarski’s semantics’ (33).
Brief as it is, Ray Brassier’s ‘Nihil Unbound: Remarks on Subtractive Ontology 
and Thinking Capitalism’ is perhaps the strongest offering in the second category. It 
engages, in a way that much commentary does not, with the specifics of Badiou’s math-
ematical formulations. This enables Brassier to defuse common misunderstandings and, 
in particular, to demonstrate with admirable concision how Badiou’s materialism can be 
reconciled with his insistence on the ‘ontological sovereignty’ of thought (50). Notable, 
too, is Brassier’s discussion of the historicity of the constitutive decision to ‘identify being 
as nothing’ (52). Taking his cue from a remark by Badiou in Manifesto for Philosophy, he 
argues persuasively that the preconditions for this decision are nothing other than the op-
erations of capital; it is capitalism that, as ‘“over-event” of universal unbinding’, becomes 
the ‘“historical medium” for subtractive ontology, unbind[ing] nihil from the fetters 
of Presence’ (52). Brassier goes on from here to question Badiou’s identification of the 
‘errant automation of Capital’ with the ‘excess of the state’ (54), arguing that recent de-
velopments in the theorization of randomness open the possibility of an ‘entirely objective 
determination of the excess of the void as embodied in [that errancy]’ (58). What would 
need rethinking here is the absolute distinction between the mathematical definability 
of the state and the sheer randomness of the event, and this is precisely what Brassier 
proposes. To counter what he sees as Badiou’s ‘suspiciously commonsense notion of 
“chance” or “randomness”’ (55) he draws on a demonstration by gregory Chaitin of the 
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irreducible incompleteness (or randomness) that, far from being a ‘marginal, metama-
thematical anomaly’, is ‘a central, possibly even ubiquitous, mathematical predicament’ 
(57). While there is nothing here to challenge the fundamental orientation of Badiou’s 
thought, the implications for the theorization of both the event and the errancy of capi-
tal are considerable.
Equally valuable are two essays belonging to the third category—those that seek to 
explicate rather than critique aspects of Badiou’s thought. One of these is ‘Communism 
as Separation’ by Alberto Toscano, the other ‘What if the Other is Stupid? Badiou and 
Lacan on “Logical Time”’ by Ed Pluth and Dominiek Hoens. Both go beyond straight-
forward explication in that they do not simply elucidate particular Badiouian concepts—
respectively, the thinking of communism and the subjectivity of a truth procedure—but, 
additionally, offer a perspective on those concepts that effectively dethrones a lot of 
what passes as critique. Toscano’s main concern is to emphasize the eternal dimension of 
what Badiou refers to as communism. Accordingly, all subjects, in their allegiance to the 
generic, to the radically egalitarian, are essentially communist subjects, but of a com-
munism that is ‘bereft of the “fiction” that it is somehow inscribed into the dynamics of 
the social’ (148-9). No actual, or statist, regime can ever be regarded as the embodiment 
of communism in this sense; the fidelity of the subject is to the ‘eternity of the equal’ and 
the task of subjectivity is one of ‘continuous purification’, of the ‘infinite dissemination 
of what the order of representation forecloses’ (144). Pluth and Hoens also focus on the 
question of subjectivity, with particular attention to the process of apprehending, nam-
ing and affirming a truth. Central to their discussion is Badiou’s use of Lacan’s concept 
of ‘anticipatory certitude’ (182). Its context is an analysis by Lacan of a logical problem 
in which freedom is offered to the first of three prisoners who correctly identifies the 
colour of a mark that has been placed on his back. The problem cannot be solved by 
deduction alone; to be successful one of the prisoners must move forward, as if  he knew 
the answer, and by gauging the responses of the other prisoners he will be able to provide 
the correct solution. As Pluth and Hoens note, there are important differences between 
‘the truth’ as it applies to this problem and a Badiouian ‘truth procedure’; in contrast to 
the latter, the former is a ‘merely “veridical” statement’, fully confirmable within a given 
situation (189). But the anticipatory act needed to solve the problem—an act that is nei-
ther a straightforward consequence of a ‘line of reasoning’ nor ‘purely spontaneous’, but 
both simultaneously—bears in this very ambivalence a striking resemblance to the affirmation 
of a truth by the Badouian subject.
I have left until last acknowledgement of those essays that deal with art as one of 
the ‘conditions’ for philosophy. In part this reflects the layout of Hallward’s book. It 
also has to do with the formidable challenges posed by this area of Badiou’s thought, 
challenges that the contributors who focus on it—Jean-Jacques Lecercle and Jacques 
Rancière—do little more than identify. As Badiou himself makes quite clear, his con-
cern is not with aesthetic theory but with what he calls ‘inaesthetics’ which in Handbook 
of  Inaesthetics he defines as ‘a relationship between philosophy and art which, as it posits 
that art is in itself a site for the production of truths, does not claim to make art in any 
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way an object for philosophy’ (quoted by Lecercle [213] and Rancière [219]). It is the 
implications of this radical separation that interests both Lecercle and Rancière. Of the 
two contributions, Rancierè’s is the most strictly philosophical. His primary concern is 
to position Badiou’s inaesthetics against the theorization of art as it evolved from Plato 
to Hegel, and he sees it as aligned to (yet distinguishable from) what he calls modern-
ism’s ‘anti-aesthetic consensus’. In contrast, Lecercle, attending more closely to the detail 
of Badiou’s discussion of art (or, more specifically, poetry), responds from the perspec-
tive of literary critic. He finds Badiou’s reading of particular poems both illuminating 
and frustrating, and records his conflicting impressions as a series of ‘paradoxes’. Central 
to these paradoxes is Badiou’s emphasis on the ‘thinking’ of the poem—especially the 
Mallarméan poem—as something that lies quite outside the domain of ‘semantics and 
meaning’ (212); it is found, rather, in the realm of ‘syntactic machination[s]’ (214). At the 
same time, this leads to a further paradox in that syntax, by default, becomes ‘another 
name for semantics’ (216). Nevertheless, in spite of his misgivings, Lecercle recognizes 
clearly the significance of Badiou’s ‘anti-linguistic’ turn for the theorization of the propo-
sition that literature thinks. And while questions remain, Lercercle cannot but admire 
Badiou’s achievement in formulating not just a poetics but an entire philosophical posi-
tion that constitutes a ‘point of resistance to the postmodern invasion’ (217). 
Think Again undoubtedly goes a long way towards clarifying important aspects of Ba-
diou’s work. It also identifies a range of elements that remain problematic, though here 
the boundary between spurious objections and informed critique is at times blurred. Yet 
as Bruno Bosteels points out, the real challenge posed by Badiou’s thought requires in-
tervention at a transformative and not merely exegetical level (164). How this challenge 
is met will determine Badiou’s impact on the future of philosophy.  
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